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Abstract
We develop new voting mechanisms for the case when voters and candidates are located in an ar-
bitrary unknown metric space, and the goal is to choose a candidate minimizing social cost: the total
distance from the voters to this candidate. Previous work has often assumed that only ordinal prefer-
ences of the voters are known (instead of their true costs), and focused on minimizing distortion: the
quality of the chosen candidate as compared with the best possible candidate. In this paper, we instead
assume that a (very small) amount of information is known about the voter preference strengths, not
just about their ordinal preferences. We provide mechanisms with much better distortion when this ex-
tra information is known as compared to mechanisms which use only ordinal information. We quantify
tradeoffs between the amount of information known about preference strengths and the achievable dis-
tortion. We further provide advice about which type of information about preference strengths seems to
be the most useful. Finally, we conclude by quantifying the ideal candidate distortion, which compares
the quality of the chosen outcome with the best possible candidate that could ever exist, instead of only
the best candidate that is actually in the running.
1 Introduction
One often hears about ‘where candidates stand’ on issues, calling to mind a spatial model of preferences
in social choice [4, 21, 23, 26, 29]. In proximity-based spatial models, voters’ preferences over candidates
are derived from their distances to each of the candidates in some issue space. In particular, we consider
voters and candidates which lie in an arbitrary unknown metric space. Our work follows a recent line of
research in social choice which considers this setting [1, 2, 3, 8, 13, 14, 15, 17, 19, 20, 22, 27, 30]. The
distance between each voter and the winning candidate is interpreted as the cost to that voter. Naturally,
one of the main goals is to select the candidate which minimizes the total Social Cost, i.e., the sum of
costs to the voters.
The crucial observation in the work cited above is that the actual costs of the voters for the selection of
each candidate (i.e., the distances in the metric space) are often unknown or difficult to obtain [9]. Instead,
it is more reasonable to assume that voters only report ordinal preferences: orderings over the candidates
which are induced by, and consistent with, latent individual costs. Because of this, past research has
often focused on optimizing distortion: the worst-case ratio between the winning candidate selected by
a voting rule aware of only ordinal preferences, and the best available candidate which minimizes the
overall social cost. Many insights were obtained for this setting, including that there are deterministic
voting rules which obtain a distortion of at most a small constant (5 in [1], and more recently 4.236 in
[25]), and that no deterministic rule can obtain a distortion of better than 3 given access to only ordinal
information.1
The fundamental assumption and motivation in the above work is that the strength or intensity of
voter preferences is not possible to obtain, and thus we must do the best we can with only ordinal
1We focus on deterministic mechanisms in this paper; see Related Work for discussion of why.
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preferences. And indeed, knowing the exact strength of voter preferences is usually impossible. In many
settings, however, some cardinal information about the ardor of voter preferences is readily available
or obtainable, and is often used to affect outcomes and make better collective decisions. For example,
a decision in a meeting may be decided in favor of a minority position if those in the minority are
significantly more adamant or passionate about the issue than the apathetic majority, as revealed during
discussion or debate. In political campaigns, the amounts of monetary donations, activists attending
rallies, and other measures of “grass-root support” can cause a candidate to become a de-facto front-
runner even before an official election or primary is ever held. Because of this, in this paper we ask the
question: “How much can the quality of selected candidates be improved if we know some small amount
of information about the strength of voter preferences?”
There are many different approaches modeling, measuring, eliciting, and aggregating the strength or
intensity of voter preferences [10, 16]. Such measures can be done through survey techniques, measuring
the total amount of monetary contributions, amounts of excitement and time people spend volunteering
or advocating for particular issues, etc (see Related Work). All such measures are by their very nature
imprecise. And yet while it is unreasonable to assume that exact strength of preference is known for
every voter, it is certainly possible to obtain insights such as “there are many more voters who are
passionate about candidate A as compared to candidate B”, or quantify the approximate amount of
extreme preference strengths as opposed to the voters who are mostly indifferent. As we show in this
paper, even such a small amount of information about aggregate preference strengths or the amount
of passionate voters can greatly improve distortion, and allow mechanisms which provably result in
outcomes which are close to optimal. In fact, knowing only a single additional bit of information for
each voter (i.e., do they prefer A to B strongly, or not strongly?) is enough to greatly improve distortion.
Model and Notation
As in previous work on metric distortion, we have a set of voters V = {1, 2, . . . , n} and a set of can-
didates (or alternatives) C. These voters and candidates correspond to points in an arbitrary (unknown)
metric space d. The voter preferences over the candidates are induced by the underlying metric, i.e., vot-
ers prefer candidates who are closer to them. Voter i prefers candidate P over candidateQ (i.e., P i Q)
only if d(i, P ) ≤ d(i, Q). Moreover, we assume that the strengths of voter preferences are induced by
these latent distances. If i prefers P over Q, then the strength of this preference is αPQi =
d(i,Q)
d(i,P ) . The
cost to voter i if candidate P is elected is d(i, P ), and the goal is to select the candidate minimizing the
Social Cost: SC(P ) =
∑
i∈V
d(i, P ).
In previous work on metric distortion only the ordinal preferences were known, i.e., whether (P i
Q) or (Q i P ). In this paper, however, we assume that we are also given some information about the
preference strengths αPQi =
d(i,Q)
d(i,P ) as well. Note that knowing these values still does not tell us how
d(i, P ) compares with d(j, P ) for i 6= j, only how strongly each voter feels when comparing different
candidates. In fact, while even knowing the exact preference strengths of all the voters is not enough to
be able to select the optimum candidate (as we show in this paper), knowing just one bit of information
about αPQi (such as whether α
PQ
i ≥ τ for a threshold τ ) is enough to create mechanisms with much
better distortion.
For a given voting ruleR and instance I = {V, C, d}, let PI be the winning candidate selected byR
and let ZI be the best available candidate (the one minimizing the Social Cost). Then, the distortion of
winning candidate PI is defined as
δI =
SC(PI)
SC(ZI)
The distortion of a voting ruleR is defined its behavior on a worst-case instance:
δ = max
I
δI = max
I
SC(PI)
SC(ZI)
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Our Contributions
What type of knowledge of the strengths of voter preferences is most useful and advantageous? What
voting mechanisms should be used in order to minimize distortion if you have access to more information
than only ordinal preferences? If you could gather data about voter preferences in different ways, what
should you aim for in order to reduce distortion? These are some of the questions which we attempt to
illuminate in this paper.
In this work, we study the possible distortion with different levels of voter preference strength in-
formation. A summary of our results is shown in Table 1. We begin with the setting in which we are
given the voters’ ordinal preferences, as well as a threshold τ ≥ 1 of voter preference strength. In
other words, for any two candidates P and Q, we know the number of voters who prefer P to Q, as
well as how many of them prefer P to Q by at least a factor of τ (i.e., d(i, P ) < 1τ d(i, Q)). Based on
only this information about the voter preferences (and the fact that the voters and candidates are em-
bedded in some arbitrary unknown metric space), we are able to provide new voting mechanisms with
much better distortion than possible when only knowing ordinal preferences. For the case that there
are only two candidates, we provide a mechanism which achieves provably best possible distortion of
max{ τ+2τ , 3τ−1τ+1 }, as shown in Figure 1. For the setting with more than two candidates, we get a dis-
tortion of min{max{ 3τ−1τ+1 , τ+2τ } + 2,max{( 3τ−1τ+1 )2, ( τ+2τ )2}} as shown in Figure 2. Note that when
τ = 1, we get a distortion of 5. A recently paper shows a deterministic algorithm that gives a distortion
of 4.236. We believe our result can be improved using similar mechanisms to start the curve in Figure 2
from 4.236.
Distortion Two Candidates More than Two Candidates
Preferences and a threshold τ max{ τ+2τ , 3τ−1τ+1 }
min{max{3τ−1τ+1 , τ+2τ }+ 2,
max{(3τ−1τ+1 )2, ( τ+2τ )2}}
m thresholds τ1, . . . , τm max
1≤l≤m
{ τlτl+1+2τl+1−1τlτl+1+1 } max1≤l≤m{(
τlτl+1+2τl+1−1
τlτl+1+1
)2}
Exact preference strengths
√
2 2
Table 1: Distortion in different settings.
From Figure 1 and 2, we can see that the distortion is minimized when τ = 1 +
√
2 in both settings.
With only voter preferences being known, the best known deterministic distortion bounds are 3 for two
candidates [1], and 4.236 for multiple candidates [25]. Interestingly, if we are also allowed to a choose
a threshold τ , our results indicate that the optimal thing to do is to differentiate between candidates with
lots of supporters who prefer them at least 1 +
√
2 times to other candidates, and candidates which have
few such supporters. By obtaining this information, we can improve the quality of the chosen candidate
from a 3-approximation to only a 1.83 approximation (for 2 candidates), and from a 4.236-approximation
to a 3.35-approximation (for ≥ 3 candidates). This is a huge improvement obtained with relatively little
extra cost in information gathering.
In Section 5 we consider the case when we only know the preferences of voters who feel strongly
about their choice (prefer P to Q by at least τ times), but do not know the preferences of voters who
are relatively indifferent. We show that knowing how many voters feel strongly about a candidate is
actually more important than knowing the ordinal preferences of all voters when attempting to minimize
distortion: for example if we have τ = 2 we can obtain a distortion of 2 as well, even if we don’t know
the preferences of all voters.
We then consider a more general case in Section 6. Suppose we have m different thresholds {1 ≤
τ1 < τ2 < . . . < τm}, and voters report the largest threshold which their preference strength exceeds
for each pair of candidates. Asm gets larger, the information about preference strengths gets less coarse;
for most settings it would be realistic to assume that m is small, but we provide a result which is as
general as possible. With this information, we give a mechanism achieving the provably best distortion
of max
1≤l≤m
{ τlτl+1+2τl+1−1τlτl+1+1 } in the two candidates setting, and a distortion of max1≤l≤m{(
τlτl+1+2τl+1−1
τlτl+1+1
)2}
in the multiple candidates setting. Note that knowing all the preference strengths exactly is still not
enough to always be able to choose the optimum candidate: the preference strengths are relative (“I like
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Figure 1: Distortion for two candidates with pref-
erences and a threshold τ .
Figure 2: Distortion for more than two candidates
with preferences and a threshold τ .
A twice as much as B”) as opposed to absolute. We never obtain information about how the costs of
different voters compare to each other, the only thing we know is that the voters lie in a metric space. In
fact, when we know the exact preference strengths of every voter, we obtain a distortion bound of
√
2 in
the two candidates setting, and a distortion of 2 in the multiple candidates setting. Moreover, we prove
that even knowing the exact preference strengths, it is not possible to obtain distortion better than
√
2 in
the worst case.
Ideal Candidate Distortion In addition to forming mechanisms with small distortion, we also have
a secondary goal in this paper. Rather than only comparing the winning candidate to the best available
candidate, we can also measure them against the ideal conceivable candidate Z∗I who may not be an
available option to vote upon. Z∗I is the point in the metric space which minimizes social cost; it is
the absolute best consensus of the voters, and it would be wonderful if that point corresponded to a
candidate, but that may not be the case (i.e., Z∗I may not be in C). We introduce the notion of ideal
candidate distortion as follows, where I = {V, C, d} is any instance and PI is the winner that our
mechanism selects for instance I:
∆ =
SC(PI)
SC(Z∗I )
As we show, while the ideal candidate distortion ∆ is unbounded in general, for many simple voting
rules it can be bounded as a function of the distortion of the winning candidate (δI ). Intuitively, the
distortion δI can only be high when the best available candidate (best in C) is close to being the ideal
possible candidate (best in the entire metric space).
A summary of our results on this topic is shown in Table 2. These results imply that if we are only
given ordinal preferences, as in most previous work, and use certain mechanisms like the Copeland
voting mechanism, then either the selected candidate is much closer to the best candidate in the running
than the worst-case distortion bound indicates (say within factor of δI = 3 instead of the worst-case of 5
for the Copeland mechanism), or the selected candidate is not far from the ideal candidate, i.e., the best
candidate that could ever exist (say within factor of 6 if δI = 3). So in the case when distortion is high,
we at least can comfort ourselves with the fact that the selected candidate is not too far away from the
best possible candidate that could ever exist, not just from the best candidate in the running.
2 Related Work and Discussion
The concept of distortion was introduced by [28] as a measure of efficiency for ordinal social choice
functions (see also [1, 9] for discussion). Since then, two main approaches have emerged for analyzing
the distortion of various voting mechanisms. One is assuming that the underlying unknown utilities or
4
Ideal Candidates Distortion Two Candidates Multiple Candidates
Only preferences 2δIδI−1
4δI
δI−1
Preferences and a threshold τ 2δIδI−1
4δI
δI−1
Exact preference strengths (
√
2+1)δI
δI−1
2(
√
2+1)δI
δI−1
Table 2: Ideal candidate distortion (∆) bounds
costs are normalized in some way, as in e.g., [5, 6, 7, 9, 11, 12]. The second approach, which we take here,
assumes all voters and candidates are points in a metric space [1, 2, 3, 8, 13, 14, 15, 17, 19, 20, 22, 27, 30].
In particular, when the latent numerical costs that induce voter preferences over a set of candidates obey
the triangle inequality, it is known that simple deterministic voting rules yield distortion which is always
at most a small constant (5 for the well-known Copeland mechanism [1], and recently 4.236 for a more
sophisticated, yet elegant, mechanism [25]). While [1] showed that no deterministic mechanism can
always produce distortion better than 3, closing this gap remains an open question.
Randomized vs Deterministic Mechanisms In this paper we restrict our attention to determinis-
tic social choice rules, instead of randomized ones as in e.g., [2, 11, 17, 22], for several reasons. First,
consider looking at our mechanisms from a social choice perspective, i.e., as voting rules that need to
be adopted by organizations and used in practice. People are far more resistant to adopting random-
ized voting protocols. This is because an election with a non-trivial probability of producing a terrible
outcome is usually considered undesirable, even if the expected outcomes are good. There are many ex-
ceptions to this, of course, but nevertheless deterministic mechanisms are easier to convince people to
adopt. Second, consider looking at our mechanisms from the point of view of approximation algorithms,
i.e., as algorithms which attempt to produce an approximately-optimal solution given a limited amount
of information. For traditional randomized approximation algorithms with guarantees on the quality of
the expected outcome it is possible to run the algorithm several times, take the best of the results, and
be relatively sure that you have achieved an outcome close to the expectation. In this setting of limited
information, however, we cannot know the “true” cost of a candidate even after a randomized mech-
anism chooses it, and thus cannot take the best outcome after several runs. Therefore, unless stronger
approximation guarantees are given than simply bounds on the expectation, it is quite likely that the out-
come of a randomized algorithm in our setting would be far from the expected value. While randomized
algorithms are certainly worthy of study even in our setting, and many interesting questions about them
exist, we choose to focus only on deterministic algorithms in this paper.
Attempts to exploit preference strength information have led to various approaches for modeling,
eliciting, measuring, and aggregating people’s preference intensities in a variety of fields, including
Likert scales, semantic differential scales, sliders, constant sum paired comparisons, graded pair com-
parisons, response times, willingness to pay, vote buying, and many others (see [10, 16, 18] for sum-
maries). In our work we specifically consider only a small amount of coarse information about prefer-
ence strengths, since obtaining detailed information is extremely difficult. Intuitively, any rule used to
aggregate preference strengths must ask under what circumstances an ‘apathetic majority’ should win
over a more passionate minority [31], and we provide a partial answer to this question when the objective
is to minimize distortion.
Perhaps most related to our work is that of [2] which introduced the concept of decisiveness. Using
our notation, [2] proves bounds on distortion under the assumption that every voter has a preference
strength at least α between their top and second-favorite candidates. We, on the other hand, do not require
that voters have any specific preference strength between any of their alternatives, and provide general
mechanisms and distortion bounds based on knowing a bit more about voters (arbitrary) preference
strengths. In other words, while [2] limits the possible space of voter preferences and locations in the
metric space, we instead allow those to be completely arbitrary, but assume that we are given slightly
more information about them.
In our model, when voter preference strength is less than the smallest threshold (τ1 > 1), they ef-
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fectively abstain because their preferred candidate is unknown, and so any reasonable weighted majority
rule must assign them a weight of 0. Therefore, our work also bears resemblance to literature on voter
abstentions in spatial voting (see [19] and references therein). While there are major technical differ-
ences in our model and that of [19], at a high level the model of [19] is similar to a special case of
ours with only two candidates and a single threshold on preference strengths (and no knowledge of voter
preferences otherwise), which we analyze in Section 5.
Finally, in this paper we assume that the preference strengths given to our algorithms are truthful,
i.e., that the voters do not lie. While it would certainly be interesting and important to consider the case
where voters may not be truthful (as in e.g., [7, 17]), for many settings with preference strengths it is
actually more reasonable to expect voters to be truthful than for settings with only ordinal votes. This
is because preference strengths are often signaled passively (e.g., average response times to surveys) or
expressing this intensity comes at a cost (e.g., time commitments, activism, or monetary contributions
and payments). Even in debates and committees where a member signals their strong preference for A
over B, this member is putting their reputation on the line in doing so, and so may not want to do this
unless their preference is actually that strong, in order to not look foolish or inconsistent in the future.
3 Preliminaries and Lower Bounds
In our model we have a set of voters V = {1, 2, . . . , n} and a set of candidates C. These voters and
candidates correspond to points in an arbitrary metric space d, so for any three points x, y, z the triangle
inequality holds: d(x, y) ≤ d(x, z) + d(y, z). We assume that voters’ preferences over the candidates
are induced by the underlying metric, and that voters are truthful (i.e., non-strategic). That is, voters
prefer candidates who are closer to them. Voter i prefers candidate P over candidate Q (P i Q) only
if d(i, P ) ≤ d(i, Q). Moreover, we assume that the strength of voters’ preferences are induced by these
latent distances. If i prefers P over Q, then the strength of this preferences is αPQi =
d(i,Q)
d(i,P ) . When it is
clear we are referring to 2 candidates P and Q, we will drop the superscript.
Given a set of preference strength thresholds {1 ≤ τ1 < τ2 < . . . < τm}, voters report the largest
threshold which their preference strength exceeds for each pair of candidates. We let Al = {i ∈ V :
d(i, P ) ≤ d(i, Q) and τl ≤ αPQi < τl+1} andBl = {j ∈ V : d(j,Q) ≤ d(j, P ) and τl ≤ αQPj < τl+1}.
For convenience, we say τm+1 = ∞ and τ0 = 1/τ1. When τ1 = 1 we know the preferred candidate of
every voter. When τ1 > 1 we let C denote the set of voters with preference strength strictly less than τ1
whose preferred candidate is unknown. When m→∞, we know the exact preference strength of every
voter for every pair of candidates.
We consider cost to voter i if candidate P is elected as d(i, P ) and the Social Cost is the sum of the
costs to all of the individual agents, SC(P ) =
∑
i∈V
d(i, P ). We would like to select the candidate with
the minimum social cost. However, preference strength information is insufficient for any mechanism
to guarantee selection of the best available candidate. Therefore, our primary goal is study and design
mechanisms which minimize distortion (δ), the worst-case approximation ratio between the social cost
of the candidate we select and the best available candidate over all possible instances, as defined in the
Introduction.
3.1 Lower Bounds on Distortion with Preference Strengths
Here, we provide lower bounds on the minimum distortion any deterministic mechanism can achieve
given only preference strength information. First, note that even if all exact preference strengths were
known to us, we still would not be able to choose the optimum candidate: knowing the relative strength
of preference for every voter is not the same thing as knowing their exact distances to every candidate
(i.e., we would only know αi =
d(i,P )
d(i,Q) and not d(i, P ) and d(i, Q) themselves).
Theorem 1. No deterministic mechanism with only preference strength information can achieve a worst-
case distortion less than
√
2.
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Proof. The example used is in 1D, where candidates P and Q are represented by points on a line.
We normalize the distances so that P is at location 0 and Q is at location 1. Suppose half the voters
prefer P with strength 1 +
√
2, and the other half prefer Q with strength 1 +
√
2. Since this is the
only information known to the mechanism, the mechanism must tie-break in some arbitrary way (if tie-
breaking is undesirable, we can have one extra voter prefer P , which will result in distortion arbitrarily
close to
√
2 instead of exactly
√
2). Thus without loss of generality, we let P be the winner over Q.
Suppose the true location of the voters is as follows. Half of the voters are located at 1
2+
√
2
and the
other half are located at 3+2
√
2
2+
√
2
. All voters have a preference strength of 1 +
√
2. If there are N voters,
the candidates have social costs SC(P ) = 2N and SC(Q) =
√
2N . Thus, if P wins we have a lower
bound on distortion of δ ≥ √2.
Of course it is unrealistic to expect to know the exact preference strengths of all the voters. Below
we give a general lower bound for the best distortion possible given knowledge of certain preference
thresholds.
Theorem 2. When given knowledge of m fixed thresholds, no deterministic mechanism can always
achieve a distortion less than max
0≤l≤m
{ τlτl+1+2τl+1−1τlτl+1+1 }
Proof. The proof follows from the following 3 lemmas. The examples used for these lemmas are all in
1D, where candidates P and Q are represented by points on a line. We normalize the distances so that
P is at location 0 and Q is at location 1 and use  to denote an infinitesimal quantity. Without loss of
generality, we let P be the winner over Q. Recall that we have defined τ0 = 1τ1 and τm+1 = ∞ for
convenience.
Lemma 3. If we have a set of thresholds of which the smallest is τ1 > 1, no deterministic mechanism
can always achieve a distortion less than τ1.
Proof. Suppose all N voters are located at position τ1τ1+1 − . All voters therefore have preference
strength less than τ1, so |C| = N and the preferred candidates of the voters are unknown. If P wins over
Q due to tie-breaking, as → 0 this yields a lower bound on distortion of δ ≥ τ1.
Lemma 4. If we have a set of thresholds of which the largest is τm > 1, no deterministic mechanism
can always achieve a distortion less than τm+2τm .
Proof. Suppose half of the voters are located on top of Q at position 1 and the other half of voters are
located at 1τm+1 − , so |Am| = |Bm| = N/2. If P wins over Q due to tie-breaking, as → 0 this yields
a lower bound on distortion of δ ≥ τm+2τm .
Lemma 5. If we have a set of thresholds, of which two consecutive thresholds are τl and τl+1 where
τl < τl+1, no deterministic mechanism can achieve a distortion less than
τlτl+1+2τl+1−1
τlτl+1+1
.
Proof. Suppose half of the voters are located at position 1τl+1 −  and the other half are located at
position 1 + 1τl+1−1 + . Once again, the mechanism must choose randomly between the candidates
because |Al| = |Bl| = N/2. Therefore, if P wins over Q due to tie-breaking, as  → 0, this yields a
lower bound on distortion of δ ≥ τlτl+1+2τl+1−1τlτl+1+1 .
The combination of the three preceding lemmas guarantees the lower bound of Theorem 2.
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4 Adding the knowledge of a single threshold τ to ordinal prefer-
ences
4.1 Distortion with Two Candidates
In this section we begin by analyzing the case with only two possible candidates. In the section that
follows, we use these results to form mechanisms with small distortion for multiple candidates. Suppose
there are two candidates P and Q. We are given the users’ ordinal preferences, and a strength threshold
τ , i.e., for every voter we only know two bits of information: whether they prefer P or Q, and whether
their preference is strong (> τ ) or weak (≤ τ ). Note that our results still hold if we only have this
knowledge in aggregate, i.e., if for both P and Q we know approximately how many people prefer P to
Q strongly versus weakly, and vice versa.
Notice that preference strengths tell us little about the true underlying distances for voters with weak
preference strengths, because the preference strength of a voter almost directly between P and Q who
is very close to both can have the same preference strength as a voter who is very distant from both
candidates. However, if a voter’s preference strength is large, we know they must be fairly close to one
of the candidates - and it is these passionate voters who contribute most to distortion.
Weighted Majority Rule 1. Given voters’ preferences and a threshold τ for two candidates, if τ ≥√
2 + 1, assign weight τ+1τ−1 to all the voters with preference strengths > τ and weight 1 to all the voters
with preference strengths ≤ τ . If τ < √2 + 1, assign weight τ to all the voters with preference strengths
> τ and weight 1 to all the voters with preference strengths ≤ τ . Choose the candidate by a weighted
majority vote.
The following theorem shows that the above voting rule produces much better distortion than any-
thing possible from knowing only the ordinal preferences. Moreover, due to the lower bounds in the
previous section, this is the best distortion possible (apply Theorem 2 with τ1 = 1 and τ2 = τ ).
Theorem 6. With 2 candidates in a metric space, if we know voters’ preferences and a strength threshold
τ , Weighted Majority Rule 1 has a distortion of at most δ = max{ τ+2τ , 3τ−1τ+1 }.
Proof. Denote the set of voters prefer P with preference strengths > τ as A2, and with preference
strengths ≤ τ as A1. Also denote the set of voters prefer Q with preference strengths > τ as B2, and
with preference strengths ≤ τ as B1. Without loss of generality, suppose we choose P as the winner by
our weighted majority rule. It means that if τ ≥ √2 + 1, τ+1τ−1 |A2| + |A1| ≥ |B1| + τ+1τ−1 |B2|, and for
τ <
√
2 + 1, τ |A2|+ |A1| ≥ |B1|+ τ |B2|.
Proof Sketch and Main Idea: For all voters, consider their individual ratio of d(i,P )d(i,Q) , regardless of which
candidate they prefer. For voters who prefer P this is their preference strength, and for voters who prefer
Q this is the reciprocal of their preference strength. If for all voters this was less than δ, then clearly we
have a distortion of at most δ by just summing them up. However, for some voters this ratio is higher and
for others it is lower. If we think of charging SC(P ) to SC(Q), we should charge the voters for whom
this ratio is lower to the voters for whom this ratio is higher. Clearly, for any voters who prefer P this
ratio is less than 1 and so it is less than δ. For voters who prefer Q, some voters with weak preferences
will allow us to save charge while others with stronger preferences will use up the extra charge. However,
charging the voters to other voters seems quite difficult in this setting. The main new technique in our
proof is to use d(P,Q) as a sort of numeraire or store of value. We first perform the charging for all
voters for whom this ratio is small, and we use d(P,Q) to quantify how much extra charge is saved. We
then show that this quantity of charge stored in terms of d(P,Q) is sufficient to expend the charge from
the remaining voters, yielding a distortion at most δ.
We first show some lemmas to bound d(i, P ) by d(i, Q) and d(P,Q) for every voter i.
Lemma 7. ∀i ∈ A2, for any δ ≥ 1, d(i, P ) ≤ δd(i, Q)− δτ−1τ+1 d(P,Q).
Proof. ∀i ∈ A2, d(i, P ) ≤ 1τ d(i, Q). By the triangle inequality,
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d(P,Q) ≤ d(i, P ) + d(i, Q) ≤ 1
τ
d(i, Q) + d(i, Q) =
1 + τ
τ
d(i, Q)
Thus d(i, Q) ≥ ττ+1d(P,Q). ∀i ∈ A2,
d(i, P ) ≤ 1
τ
d(i, Q)
= δd(i, Q)− (δ − 1
τ
)d(i, Q)
≤ δd(i, Q)− δτ − 1
τ + 1
d(P,Q)
Lemma 8. ∀i ∈ A1, for any δ ≥ 1, d(i, P ) ≤ δd(i, Q)− δ−12 d(P,Q).
Proof. ∀i ∈ A1, by the triangle inequality,
d(P,Q) ≤ d(i, P ) + d(i, Q) ≤ d(i, Q) + d(i, Q) = 2d(i, Q)
Thus d(i, Q) ≥ 12d(P,Q). ∀i ∈ A1,
d(i, P ) ≤ d(i, Q)
= δd(i, Q)− (δ − 1)d(i, Q)
≤ δd(i, Q)− δ − 1
2
d(P,Q)
Lemma 9. ∀j ∈ B1, for any 1 ≤ δ ≤ τ , d(j, P ) ≤ δd(j,Q) + τ−δτ−1d(P,Q).
∀j ∈ B1, for any δ > τ , d(j, P ) ≤ δd(j,Q)− δ−ττ+1d(P,Q).
Proof. First consider the case that 1 ≤ δ ≤ τ .
∀j ∈ B1, d(j, P ) ≤ τd(j,Q). Also, by the triangle inequality, d(j, P ) ≤ d(j,Q) + d(P,Q). By a
linear combination of these two inequalities,
d(j, P ) ≤ δ − 1
τ − 1τd(j,Q) + (1−
δ − 1
τ − 1)(d(j,Q) + d(P,Q))
≤ δd(j,Q) + τ − δ
τ − 1d(P,Q)
Then consider the case that δ > τ .
∀j ∈ B1, d(j, P ) ≤ τd(j,Q). By the triangle inequality,
d(P,Q) ≤ d(j, P ) + d(j,Q) ≤ τd(j,Q) + d(j,Q) = (1 + τ)d(j,Q)
Thus d(j,Q) ≥ 11+τ d(P,Q). ∀j ∈ B1,
d(j, P ) ≤ τd(j,Q)
= δd(j,Q)− (δ − τ)d(j,Q)
≤ δd(j,Q)− δ − τ
τ + 1
d(P,Q)
Lemma 10. ∀j ∈ B2, d(j, P ) ≤ d(j,Q) + d(P,Q).
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Proof. This lemma follows directly by the triangle inequality.
Using the four lemmas above, sum up for all voters, for any δ > τ ,∑
i∈A1
d(i, P ) +
∑
i∈A2
d(i, P ) +
∑
j∈B1
d(j, P ) +
∑
j∈B2
d(j, P )
≤ δ
∑
i∈A1
d(i, Q)− |A1|δ − 1
2
d(P,Q) + δ
∑
i∈A2
d(i, Q)− |A2|δτ − 1
τ + 1
d(P,Q)
+ δ
∑
j∈B1
d(j,Q)− |B1|δ − τ
τ + 1
d(P,Q) +
∑
j∈B2
d(j,Q) + |B2|d(P,Q)
≤ δ
∑
i
d(i, Q) + (−|A1|δ − 1
2
− |A2|δτ − 1
τ + 1
− |B1|δ − τ
τ + 1
+ |B2|)d(P,Q) (1)
Similarly, for any 1 ≤ δ ≤ τ ,∑
i
d(i, P ) ≤ δ
∑
i
d(i, Q) + (−|A1|δ − 1
2
− |A2|δτ − 1
τ + 1
+ |B1|τ − δ
τ − 1 + |B2|)d(P,Q) (2)
Now we prove Theorem 6 by considering two cases: τ ≥ √2 + 1 and τ < √2 + 1.
Case 1, τ ≥ √2 + 1, and τ+1τ−1 |A2|+ |A1| ≥ |B1|+ τ+1τ−1 |B2|
We prove the distortion is at most 3τ−1τ+1 in this case. Set δ =
3τ−1
τ+1 . Note that when τ ≥ 1,
δ = 3τ−1τ+1 ≤ τ . By inequality 2, if we can prove (−|A1| δ−12 − |A2| δτ−1τ+1 + |B1| τ−δτ−1 + |B2|) ≤ 0, then∑
i d(i, P ) ≤ δ
∑
i d(i, Q).
When δ = 3τ−1τ+1 ,
− |A1|δ − 1
2
− |A2|δτ − 1
τ + 1
+ |B1|τ − δ
τ − 1 + |B2|
= −τ − 1
τ + 1
|A1| − 3τ
2 − 2τ − 1
(τ + 1)2
|A2|+ τ − 1
τ + 1
|B1|+ |B2|
≤ −τ − 1
τ + 1
|A1| − |A2|+ τ − 1
τ + 1
|B1|+ |B2|
≤ 0
The second to last line follows because 3τ
2−2τ−1
(τ+1)2 ≥ 1 when τ ≥
√
2 + 1. The last line follows
because τ+1τ−1 |A2|+ |A1| ≥ |B1|+ τ+1τ−1 |B2|.
Case 2, τ <
√
2 + 1, and τ |A2|+ |A1| ≥ |B1|+ τ |B2|
We prove the distortion is at most τ+2τ in this case. Set δ =
τ+2
τ . Furthermore, we consider two
subcases that 1 ≤ τ < 2 and 2 ≤ τ < √2 + 1.
Case 2.1, 2 ≤ τ < √2 + 1
When 2 ≤ τ < √2 + 1 and δ = τ+2τ , it is easy to show that 1 ≤ δ ≤ τ . By inequality 2, if we can
prove (−|A1| δ−12 − |A2| δτ−1τ+1 + |B1| τ−δτ−1 + |B2|) ≤ 0, then
∑
i d(i, P ) ≤ δ
∑
i d(i, Q).
When δ = τ+2τ ,
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− |A1|δ − 1
2
− |A2|δτ − 1
τ + 1
+ |B1|τ − δ
τ − 1 + |B2|
= −1
τ
|A1| − |A2|+ τ
2 − τ − 2
τ(τ − 1) |B1|+ |B2|
≤ −1
τ
|A1| − |A2|+ 1
τ
|B1|+ |B2|
≤ 0
The second to last line follows because τ
2−τ−2
τ(τ−1) ≤ 1τ when 2 ≤ τ <
√
2 + 1. The last line follows
because τ |A2|+ |A1| ≥ |B1|+ τ |B2|.
Case 2.2, 1 ≤ τ < 2
Because 1 ≤ τ < 2 and δ = τ+2τ , it is easy to show that δ > τ . By inequality 1, if we can prove
(−|A1| δ−12 − |A2| δτ−1τ+1 − |B1| δ−ττ+1 + |B2|) ≤ 0, then
∑
i d(i, P ) ≤ δ
∑
i d(i, Q). When δ =
τ+2
τ ,
− |A1|δ − 1
2
− |A2|δτ − 1
τ + 1
− |B1|δ − τ
τ + 1
+ |B2|
= −1
τ
|A1| − |A2|+ τ − 2
τ
|B1|+ |B2|
≤ −1
τ
|A1| − |A2|+ 1
τ
|B1|+ |B2|
≤ 0
The second to last line follows because τ−2τ < 0 <
1
τ when 1 ≤ τ < 2. The last line follows because
τ |A2|+ |A1| ≥ |B1|+ τ |B2|.
Thus, we have shown that the distortion is at most 3τ−1τ+1 when τ ≥
√
2 + 1, and at most τ+2τ when
τ <
√
2 + 1. Note that 3τ−1τ+1 ≥ τ+2τ when τ ≥
√
2 + 1, and 3τ−1τ+1 <
τ+2
τ when τ <
√
2 + 1. Thus, the
distortion of the weighted majority rule in this setting is max{ 3τ−1τ+1 , τ+2τ }.
Note that Weighted Majority Rule 1 is not the only rule that gives the optimal distortion for two
candidates. Consider the following simpler rule:
Weighted Majority Rule 2. Given voters’ preferences and a threshold τ for two candidates, assign
weight τ+1τ−1 to all the voters with preference strengths > τ and weight 1 to all the voters with preference
strengths ≤ τ .
This rule gives the same distortion as Weighted Majority Rule 1 for two candidates, as we prove
below. When extending these rules to more than 2 candidates, however, Weighted Majority Rule 1 allows
us to form better mechanisms, thus sacrificing a small amount of simplicity for an improvement in
distortion. We discuss this in the next section.
Theorem 11. Weighted Majority Rule 2 has a distortion of at most max{ 3τ−1τ+1 , τ+2τ }.
Proof. Denote the set of voters prefer P with preference strengths > τ as A2, and with preference
strengths ≤ τ as A1. Also denote the set of voters prefer Q with preference strengths > τ as B2, and
with preference strengths ≤ τ as B1. Without loss of generality, suppose we choose P as the winner by
Weighted Majority Rule 2. Thus, τ+1τ−1 |A2|+ |A1| ≥ |B1|+ τ+1τ−1 |B2|.
Similar to the proof of Theorem 6, we discuss three cases based on different values of τ .
Case 1, 1 ≤ τ < 2
Set δ = τ+2τ . Because 1 ≤ τ < 2, it is easy to show that δ > τ . By inequality 1, if we can prove
(−|A1| δ−12 − |A2| δτ−1τ+1 − |B1| δ−ττ+1 + |B2|) ≤ 0, then
∑
i d(i, P ) ≤ δ
∑
i d(i, Q). When δ =
τ+2
τ ,
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− |A1|δ − 1
2
− |A2|δτ − 1
τ + 1
− |B1|δ − τ
τ + 1
+ |B2|
= −1
τ
|A1| − |A2|+ τ − 2
τ
|B1|+ |B2|
≤ −τ − 1
τ + 1
|A1| − |A2|+ τ − 1
τ + 1
|B1|+ |B2|
≤ 0
The second to last line follows because 1τ ≥ τ−1τ+1 and τ−2τ < 0 < τ−1τ+1 when 1 ≤ τ < 2. The last
line follows because τ+1τ−1 |A2|+ |A1| ≥ |B1|+ τ+1τ−1 |B2|.
Case 2, 2 ≤ τ < √2 + 1
Set δ = τ+2τ . When 2 ≤ τ <
√
2 + 1, it is easy to show that 1 ≤ δ ≤ τ . By inequality 2, if we can
prove (−|A1| δ−12 − |A2| δτ−1τ+1 + |B1| τ−δτ−1 + |B2|) ≤ 0, then
∑
i d(i, P ) ≤ δ
∑
i d(i, Q).
When δ = τ+2τ ,
− |A1|δ − 1
2
− |A2|δτ − 1
τ + 1
+ |B1|τ − δ
τ − 1 + |B2|
= −1
τ
|A1| − |A2|+ τ
2 − τ − 2
τ(τ − 1) |B1|+ |B2|
≤ −τ − 1
τ + 1
|A1| − |A2|+ τ − 1
τ + 1
|B1|+ |B2|
≤ 0
The second to last line follows because 1τ ≥ τ−1τ+1 and τ
2−τ−2
τ(τ−1) ≤ τ−1τ+1 when 2 ≤ τ <
√
2 + 1. The
last line follows because τ+1τ−1 |A2|+ |A1| ≥ |B1|+ τ+1τ−1 |B2|.
Case 3, τ ≥ √2 + 1
Set δ = 3τ−1τ+1 . Note that when τ ≥
√
2 + 1, 1 ≤ δ ≤ τ . By inequality 2, if we can prove
(−|A1| δ−12 − |A2| δτ−1τ+1 + |B1| τ−δτ−1 + |B2|) ≤ 0, then
∑
i d(i, P ) ≤ δ
∑
i d(i, Q).
When δ = 3τ−1τ+1 ,
− |A1|δ − 1
2
− |A2|δτ − 1
τ + 1
+ |B1|τ − δ
τ − 1 + |B2|
= −τ − 1
τ + 1
|A1| − 3τ
2 − 2τ − 1
(τ + 1)2
|A2|+ τ − 1
τ + 1
|B1|+ |B2|
≤ −τ − 1
τ + 1
|A1| − |A2|+ τ − 1
τ + 1
|B1|+ |B2|
≤ 0
The second to last line follows because 3τ
2−2τ−1
(τ+1)2 ≥ 1 when τ ≥
√
2 + 1. The last line follows
because τ+1τ−1 |A2|+ |A1| ≥ |B1|+ τ+1τ−1 |B2|.
Thus, we proved that the distortion is at most τ+2τ when 1 ≤ τ <
√
2 + 1, and at most 3τ−1τ+1 when
τ ≥ √2 + 1.
4.2 Multiple candidates (given preferences and a threshold τ )
In this section, we discuss mechanisms with small distortion for multiple (≥ 3) candidates. We assume
that we are given the ordinal preference ordering of each voter for all the candidates, as well as an
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indication whether, for every pair of candidates, the voter has a strong preference (> τ ), or a weak
preference (≤ τ ). While this certainly requires more than a single bit of information for every voter, we
believe that such data is reasonably possible to collect: it is usually easy for users to express whether they
prefer option A to option B strongly or weakly, as opposed to trying to quantify exactly how strong their
preference is. In reality we would need to compare only the obviously front-runner candidates in this
way, and would not actually need this thresholded knowledge for every pair of candidates. As discussed
in the Introduction, this information could also be reasonably estimated from other sources, such as the
amount of monetary donations, attendance to political rallies, the amount of “buzz” on social media, etc.
The mechanisms we consider are as follows. First, we create a weighted majority graph by choosing
pairwise winners using Majority Rule 1. Then we study the distortion of the winner(s) in the uncovered
set [24] in this majority graph. Recall that if a candidate P is in the uncovered set, it means that for any
candidate Z, either P beats Z directly, or there exists another candidate Q such that P beats Q, and Q
beats Z. The uncovered set is always known to be non-empty, and for example the Copeland mechanism
always chooses a candidate in the uncovered set.
We begin with the following useful lemma due to Goel at al. [20]
Lemma 12. (Goel et al, 2017)
If a majority of voters prefer P toQ, then SC(P ) ≤ 2·SC(Z)+SC(Q) for any other possible candidate
Z.
We first show that while this lemma certainly does not hold for all pairwise majority rules, this lemma
can be generalized specifically for Majority Rule 1. We then use this to prove bounds on the distortion of
the above “uncovered set” mechanisms. This lemma is precisely why we use Majority Rule 1 instead of,
for example, simpler conditions such as Majority Rule 2, since while their distortion for two candidates
remains the same, the theorem below fails to hold.
Theorem 13. If Majority Rule 1 selects P over Q, then SC(P ) ≤ 2 · SC(Z) + SC(Q) where Z can be
any point in the metric space.
Proof. We use the same notation as before. Let A1 denote a subset of voters that prefer P to Q with
preference strengths ≤ τ , and let A2 denote a subset of voters that prefer P to Q with preference
strengths > τ . Also B1 denote a subset of voters prefer Q to P with preference strengths ≤ τ , and let
B2 denote a subset of voters prefer Q to P with preference strengths > τ . Without loss of generality,
suppose we choose P as the winner by our weighted majority rule. It means that if τ ≥ √2 + 1,
τ+1
τ−1 |A2|+ |A1| ≥ |B1|+ τ+1τ−1 |B2|, and if τ <
√
2 + 1, τ |A2|+ |A1| ≥ |B1|+ τ |B2|.
From Lemma 12, we know that if |A2|+ |A1| ≥ |B1|+ |B2|, then SC(P ) ≤ 2 · SC(Z) + SC(Q).
Consider the case that |A2|+ |A1| < |B1|+ |B2|, it is not possible that |A2| < |B2| and |A1| >= |B1|,
because A2 and B2 have heavier weight than A1 and B1. Thus the only case left is |A2| >= |B2| and
|A1| < |B1|.
We separate the voters in A2 into two subsets A′2 and A2 −A′2, such that |A′2| = |B2|. Similarly, we
separate the voters in B1 into two subsets B′1 and B1 −B′1, such that |B′1| = |A1|.
Case 1. τ ≥ √2 + 1
By our weighted majority rule,
τ + 1
τ − 1 |A2|+ |A1| ≥ |B1|+
τ + 1
τ − 1 |B2|
τ + 1
τ − 1(|A
′
2|+ |A2 −A′2|) + |B1| ≥ (|B′1|+ |B1 −B′1|) +
τ + 1
τ − 1 |B2|
τ + 1
τ − 1 |A2 −A
′
2| ≥ |B1 −B′1|
First, bound
∑
i∈B1−B′1
d(i, P ), by the triangle inequality,
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∑
i∈B1−B′1
d(i, P ) ≤
∑
B1−B′1
d(i, Z) +
∑
B1−B′1
d(P,Z)
=
∑
B1−B′1
d(i, Z) + |B1 −B′1| d(P,Z)
≤
∑
B1−B′1
d(i, Z) +
τ + 1
τ − 1 |A2 −A
′
2| d(P,Z)
=
∑
B1−B′1
d(i, Z) +
τ + 1
τ − 1
∑
A2−A′2
d(P,Z)
The second to last line follows because τ+1τ−1 |A2 − A′2| ≥ |B1 − B′1|. Using the triangle inequality
again, ∀i ∈ A2 −A′2, d(P,Z) ≤ d(i, P ) + d(i, Z), and also note that d(i, P ) ≤ 1τ d(i, Q). Thus,∑
i∈B1−B′1
d(i, P ) ≤
∑
B1−B′1
d(i, Z) +
τ + 1
τ − 1
∑
A2−A′2
d(P,Z)
≤
∑
B1−B′1
d(i, Z) +
τ + 1
τ − 1
∑
A2−A′2
(d(i, P ) + d(i, Z))
≤
∑
B1−B′1
d(i, Z) +
τ + 1
τ − 1
∑
A2−A′2
(
1
τ
d(i, Q) + d(i, Z))
=
τ + 1
τ − 1
∑
A2−A′1
d(i, Z) +
∑
B1−B′1
d(i, Z) +
τ + 1
τ(τ − 1)
∑
A2−A′2
d(i, Q)
Multiply both sides by τ−1τ ,
τ − 1
τ
∑
i∈B1−B′1
d(i, P ) ≤ τ + 1
τ
∑
A2−A′1
d(i, Z) +
τ − 1
τ
∑
B1−B′1
d(i, Z) +
τ + 1
τ2
∑
A2−A′2
d(i, Q) (3)
Also, ∀i ∈ B1−B′1, d(i, P ) ≤ τd(i, Q). So
∑
i∈B1−B′1
d(i, P ) ≤ τ ∑
i∈B1−B′1
d(i, Q). Divide both sides
by τ , we get 1τ
∑
i∈B1−B′1
d(i, P ) ≤ ∑
i∈B1−B′1
d(i, Q). Finally, ∀i ∈ A2 − A′2, bound d(i, P ) by 1τ d(i, Q).
Together with Inequality 3,∑
i∈A2−A′2
d(i, P ) +
∑
i∈B1−B′1
d(i, P )
≤ 1
τ
∑
A2−A′2
d(i, Q) +
1
τ
∑
i∈B1−B′1
d(i, P ) +
τ − 1
τ
∑
i∈B1−B′1
d(i, P )
≤ 1
τ
∑
A2−A′2
d(i, Q) +
∑
i∈B1−B′1
d(i, Q) +
τ + 1
τ
∑
A2−A′1
d(i, Z) +
τ − 1
τ
∑
B1−B′1
d(i, Z) +
τ + 1
τ2
∑
A2−A′2
d(i, Q)
=
τ + 1
τ
∑
A2−A′1
d(i, Z) +
τ − 1
τ
∑
B1−B′1
d(i, Z) +
2τ + 1
τ2
∑
A2−A′2
d(i, Q) +
∑
i∈B1−B′1
d(i, Q)
≤ 2(
∑
i∈A2−A′2
d(i, Z) +
∑
i∈B1−B′1
d(i, Z)) +
∑
i∈A2−A′2
(i, Q) +
∑
i∈B1−B′1
d(i, Q)
The last line follows because 2τ+1τ2 ≤ 1 when τ ≥
√
2 + 1.
Case 2. τ <
√
2 + 1
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By our weighted majority rule,
τ |A2|+ |A1| ≥ |B1|+ τ |B2|
τ(|A′2|+ |A2 −A′2|) + |A1| ≥ (|B′1|+ |B1 −B′1|) + τ |B2|
τ |A2 −A′2| ≥ |B1 −B′1|
The proof is almost the same as Case 1, except that we use the inequality above to bound the ratio
between |B1 −B′1| and |A2 −A′2|. Similar to Inequality 3, we get:
τ − 1
τ
∑
i∈B1−B′1
d(i, P ) ≤ (τ − 1)
∑
A2−A′1
d(i, Z) +
τ − 1
τ
∑
B1−B′1
d(i, Z) +
τ − 1
τ
∑
A2−A′2
d(i, Q) (4)
Then bound
∑
i∈A2−A′2
d(i, P ) +
∑
i∈B1−B′1
d(i, P ) similarly to Case 1,
∑
i∈A2−A′2
d(i, P ) +
∑
i∈B1−B′1
d(i, P )
=
1
τ
∑
A2−A′2
d(i, Q) +
1
τ
∑
i∈B1−B′1
d(i, P ) +
τ − 1
τ
∑
i∈B1−B′1
d(i, P )
≤ 1
τ
∑
A2−A′2
d(i, Q) +
∑
i∈B1−B′1
d(i, Q) + (τ − 1)
∑
A2−A′1
d(i, Z) +
τ − 1
τ
∑
B1−B′1
d(i, Z) +
τ − 1
τ
∑
A2−A′2
d(i, Q)
= (τ − 1)
∑
A2−A′1
d(i, Z) +
τ − 1
τ
∑
B1−B′1
d(i, Z) +
∑
A2−A′2
d(i, Q) +
∑
i∈B1−B′1
d(i, Q)
≤ 2(
∑
i∈A2−A′2
d(i, Z) +
∑
i∈B1−B′1
d(i, Z)) +
∑
i∈A2−A′2
(i, Q) +
∑
i∈B1−B′1
d(i, Q)
We have proved
∑
i∈A2−A′2+B1−B′1
(i, P ) ≤ ∑
i∈A2−A′2+B1−B′1
(i, Q) + 2
∑
i∈A2−A′2+B1−B′1
(i, Z) for any
τ ≥ 1. And because |A′2|+ |A1| = |B′1|+ |B2|, by Lemma 12,∑
i∈A′2+A1+B′1+B2
(i, P ) ≤
∑
i∈A′2+A1+B′1+B2
(i, Q) + 2
∑
i∈A′2+A1+B′1+B2
(i, Z)
Putting everything together,
∑
i(i, P ) ≤
∑
i(i, Q) + 2
∑
i(i, Z).
Now that we have the above theorem, it is easy to establish distortion bounds based on our weighted
majority rule.
Theorem 14. Suppose a weighted majority graph is formed by using Majority Rule 1 to choose pair-
wise winners. The distortion of the uncovered set of this graph is at most min{max{ 3τ−1τ+1 , τ+2τ } +
2,max{( 3τ−1τ+1 )2, ( τ+2τ )2}} in the multiple candidates setting when given voters’ ordinal preferences
and a threshold τ .
Proof. Suppose the optimal candidate is Z. By definition, for any candidate P in the uncovered set,
either P beats Z directly or there exists a candidate Q, that P beats Q and Q beats Z. And we know that
the distortion between two candidates when one beats the other directly is at most max{ 3τ−1τ+1 , τ+2τ }, so it
is straight forward that the distortion is at most max{( 3τ−1τ+1 )2, ( τ+2τ )2} for any winner in the uncovered
set.
Also, because Q beats Z, so SC(Q) ≤ max{ 3τ−1τ+1 , τ+2τ }SC(Z). By Theorem 13, we know that
SC(P ) ≤ (max{ 3τ−1τ+1 , τ+2τ }+2)SC(Z). Thus, we can get a upper bound of distortion for the uncovered
set of min{max{ 3τ−1τ+1 , τ+2τ }+ 2,max{( 3τ−1τ+1 )2, ( τ+2τ )2}}.
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4.3 Choosing the Best Threshold
What type of knowledge of the strengths in voter preferences is most useful and advantageous? If you
could gather data about voter preferences in different ways, what should you aim for in order to reduce
distortion? These are some of the questions which we wish to illuminate in this paper.
Our results in the previous two sections shed some light on these decisions. First, it may be surprising
(although it really shouldn’t be) that knowing only information about very extreme voters (i.e., τ being
high) or only about very indecisive voters (τ being very close to 1) does not help much when compared
to only knowing the voters’ ordinal preferences. Our results indicate, however, that the optimal thing to
do is to differentiate between candidates with lots of supporters who prefer them at least 2 times to other
candidates (or more precisely, at least 1+
√
2 times), and candidates which have few such supporters. Our
results indicate that by obtaining this information, we can improve the quality of the chosen candidate
from a 3-approximation to only a 1.83 approximation (for 2 candidates), and from a 5-approximation to
a 3.35-approximation (for ≥ 3 candidates). This is a huge improvement obtained with relatively little
extra cost.
5 Undecided Voters: working without knowing voter preferences
Suppose there are two candidates P andQ and for all voters with preference strength greater than thresh-
old τ , we know their preferred candidate. For all other voters we know nothing about their preferences.
This is a strict generalization of the case where we just know voter preferences, since that is the case
where τ = 1. As with the case where we only know preferences, the only reasonable voting rule is to
select the candidate preferred by the greatest number of voters, out of those for whom we know prefer-
ences. This represents the case where voters abstain if their preference strength is not sufficiently high
for them to be motivated enough to vote. In this section we consider mechanisms to deal with such
undecided or unmotivated voters.
Weighted Majority Rule 3. Given candidates P and Q and any single threshold τ ≥ 1, give all voters
with preference strength at least τ a weight of 1 and all other voters a weight of 0. Select the candidate
by weighted majority rule.
Theorem 15. With two candidates and only the preferences of voters with preference strength greater
than τ , Weighted Majority Rule 3 achieves a distortion of max{ τ+2τ , τ}, and no deterministic mechanism
can do better.
Proof. The proof is similar to that of Theorem 6, once again using d(P,Q) as an intermediate value to
charge possible voter distances to. Let A be the set of voters who strongly prefer P . That is, A = {i :
d(i,Q)
d(i,P ) ≥ τ}. Similarly, define the set of voters who strongly prefer Q as B = {j : d(j,P )d(j,Q) ≥ τ}. Let
the set of remaining voters, whose preference strengths are weaker than τ be denoted C. Without loss of
generality, let P be the winner over Q because |A| ≥ |B|.
Lemma 16. ∀i ∈ A, for any δ ≥ 1 : d(i, P ) ≤ δd(i, Q)− δτ−1τ+1 d(P,Q).
Proof. ∀i ∈ A we know that d(i, P ) ≤ 1τ d(i, Q).
It follows from triangle inequality that d(P,Q) ≤ d(i, P )+d(i, Q) ≤ 1τ (i, Q)+(i, Q) = τ+1τ (i, Q).
For any δ ≥ 1 we when have
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d(i, P ) ≤ 1
τ
d(i, Q)
= δd(i, Q)− (δ − 1
τ
)d(i, Q)
≤ δd(i, Q)− (δ − 1
τ
)(
τ
τ + 1
)d(P,Q)
= δd(i, Q)− (δτ − 1
τ + 1
)d(P,Q)
Recall that d(j, P ) ≤ d(j,Q) + d(P,Q) from triangle inequality. It therefore follows from Lemma
16 that for any δ ≥ 1,∑
i∈A
d(i, P ) +
∑
j∈B
(j, P ) ≤ δ
∑
i∈A
d(i, Q)− |A|(δτ − 1
τ + 1
)d(P,Q) +
∑
j∈B
d(j,Q) + |B|d(P,Q)
Let δ = max{ τ+2τ , τ}. We consider the two cases in which either of the two terms in this bound are
the larger term.
Case 1: If τ ≥ 2 then δ = τ , and therefore∑
i∈A
d(i, P ) +
∑
j∈B
(j, P ) ≤ δ
∑
i∈A
d(i, Q)− |A|(τ − 1)d(P,Q) +
∑
j∈B
d(j,Q) + |B|d(P,Q)
≤ δ
∑
i∈A
d(i, Q) +
∑
j∈B
(j,Q) because |A| ≥ |B|.
Case 2: If τ < 2 then δ = τ+2τ , and therefore∑
i∈A
d(i, P ) +
∑
j∈B
(j, P ) ≤ δ
∑
i∈A
d(i, Q)− |A|d(P,Q) +
∑
j∈B
d(j,Q) + |B|d(P,Q)
≤ δ
∑
i∈A
d(i, Q) +
∑
j∈B
(j,Q) because |A| ≥ |B|.
Lastly, we can see that this upper bound on δ is tight due to the lower bounds given by examples in
Lemma 3 and Lemma 4.
5.1 Choosing the Best Threshold
If we can only select a single threshold for voter preference strengths, which should we choose? Intu-
itively, this is analogous to determining how difficult it should be to vote. If it takes a little bit of effort to
vote, then you know that the voters who actually do participate have a significant interest in the outcome.
However, if the barriers to voting are too high, then the outcome can be decided by a small fraction of
the voters and fails to capture their collective preferences as a whole (see Figure 3). In our setting the
optimal choice of threshold is arg min
τ
{max{ τ+2τ , τ}} = 2, yielding a distortion of 2 (instead of 3 for
the case when τ = 1).
5.2 Multiple Candidates (given only a threshold τ )
When there are more than two candidates, we study the distortion of the uncovered set.
Theorem 17. With mutiple candidates and only the preferences of voters with preference strength greater
than τ , if Weighted Majority Rule 3 is used to choose pairwise winners, then the distortion of the uncov-
ered set of this graph is at most max{( τ+2τ )2, τ2}.
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Figure 3: Best achievable distortion for a single threshold τ .
Proof. Suppose the optimal candidate isZ. By definition, for any candidateP in the uncovered set, either
P beats Z directly or there exists a candidate Q, such that P beats Q and Q beats Z. And we know that
the distortion between two candidates when one beats the other directly is at most max{ τ+2τ , τ}, so it is
straight forward that the distortion is at most max{( τ+2τ )2, τ2} for any winner in the uncovered set.
Note that, unlike in Theorem 14, for this setting we have to settle for the trivial bound of squaring the
distortion for≥ 3 candidates. This is because, unlike for the case with known preferences and a threshold,
the property that SC(P ) ≤ 2 · SC(Z) + SC(Q) (Theorem 13) does not hold anymore. Consider the
following example: there are three candidates P , Q, and Z, and there is only one voter i, that has a
preference strength < τ between any pair of candidates, so we have no information whatsoever about
voter preferences. Without loss of generality, suppose we choose P as the winner. The actual distances
could be: d(i, P ) = τ − , d(i, Q) = 1, and d(i, Z) = 1. As  approaches 0, SC(P ) ≈ τSC(Q), and
also SC(P ) ≈ τSC(Z). When τ is large, it is not possible to have SC(P ) ≤ 2SC(Z) +SC(Q). Thus,
we cannot bound SC(P ) in the multiple candidates setting by SC(P ) ≤ 2 · SC(Z) + SC(Q) as in
Section 4.
6 Distortion with General Thresholds
In this section we generalize some of our results in the previous sections to deal with general preference
strength thresholds. We are given thresholds {1 ≤ τ1 < τ2 < . . . < τm}, and for every voter i and pair
of candidates P and Q we know the pair of thresholds between which the preference strength of i falls
into. In other words, the more thresholds we have, the less coarse our knowledge of voters preferences.
We believe it is realistic to assume that we have one or two, perhaps three, such thresholds, and for most
candidate pairs we can create a profile describing how devoted and fanatical their supporters are with
respect to these thresholds. However, in this section we consider general sets of thresholds in order to
provide bounds on distortion which are as general as possible. For convenience, we let τm+1 = ∞ and
τ0 =
1
τ1
.
We begin as before, by analyzing the case with only 2 candidates P and Q, and then extending our
results to multiple candidates.
Condition 18. Let δ = max
0≤l≤m
{ τlτl+1+2τl+1−1τlτl+1+1 }. Find k such that τk ≤ δ < τk+1. P
wins only if
m∑
l=k
( τl+1−δτl+1−1 )|Bl| ≤
m∑
l=1
( δτl−1τl+1 )|Al| +
k−1∑
l=1
|Bl|( δ−τl+1τl+1+1 ) and Q wins only if
m∑
l=k
( τl+1−δτl+1−1 )|Al| ≤
m∑
l=1
( δτl−1τl+1 )|Bl|+
k−1∑
l=1
|Al|( δ−τl+1τl+1+1 ).
The above is not a specific voting rule, but is instead a set of voting rules. We prove below that any
rule obeying the above condition has distortion at most δ, and that we can always form a rule satisfying
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this condition. Note that such a value of 0 < k ≤ m always exists because distortion is at least τ1 (since
taking the term for l = 0 gives τ1). It may be that k = m, where τm ≤ δ.
Theorem 19. Any single-winner voting rule over two candidates which satisfies Condition 18 has dis-
tortion δ = max
0≤l≤m
{ τlτl+1+2τl+1−1τlτl+1+1 } and no deterministic mechanism can do better.
Proof.
Outline: First, we prove the upper bound on distortion. We want to show that if P wins then
SC(P ) =
m∑
l=1
∑
i∈Al
d(i, P ) +
m∑
l=1
∑
j∈Bl
d(j, P ) +
∑
k∈C
d(k, P ) ≤ δ( m∑
l=1
∑
i∈Al
d(i, Q) +
m∑
l=1
∑
j∈Bl
d(j,Q) +∑
k∈C
d(j,Q)
)
= δSC(Q). We prove this by using four lemmas which each establish an upper bound on
the social cost accrued to P by a subset of the voters. To do this we use d(P,Q) as a sort of numeraire or
store of value. Summing over the three inequalities in these lemmas proves the upper bound on distortion
as long as Condition 18 is met. Tightness follows from Theorem 2 in Section 3.1.
Lemma 20. If P wins then
∑
k∈C
d(k, P ) ≤ ∑
k∈C
δd(k,Q)
Proof.
∀k ∈ C : d(k, P ) ≤ τ1 d(k,Q) and we know τ1 ≤ δ by our choice of δ.
Lemma 21. If P wins then
m∑
l=1
∑
i∈Al
d(i, P ) ≤
m∑
l=1
∑
i∈Al
δd(i, Q)−
m∑
l=1
∑
i∈Al
( δτl−1τl+1 )d(P,Q)
Proof.
Recall from the definition of Al that ∀l ≤ m,∀i ∈ Al : d(i, P ) ≤ 1τl d(i, Q).
This implies ∀l ≤ m,∀i ∈ Al : d(P,Q) ≤ d(i, P ) + d(i, Q) ≤ τl+1τl d(i, Q).
It follows that
m∑
l=1
∑
i∈Al
d(i, P ) ≤
m∑
l=1
∑
i∈Al
1
τl
d(i, Q)
=
m∑
l=1
∑
i∈Al
(
δd(i, Q)− (δ − 1
τl
)d(i, Q)
)
≤
m∑
l=1
∑
i∈Al
(
δd(i, Q)− (δτl − 1
τl
)( τl
τl + 1
)
d(P,Q)
)
=
m∑
l=1
∑
i∈Al
δd(i, Q)−
m∑
l=1
∑
i∈Al
(δτl − 1
τl + 1
)
d(P,Q)
Lemma 22. If P wins then
k−1∑
l=1
∑
j∈Bl
d(j, P ) ≤
k−1∑
l=1
∑
j∈Bl
δd(j,Q)−
k−1∑
l=1
∑
j∈Bl
( δ−τl+1τl+1+1 )d(P,Q)
Proof. Recall from the definition of Bl that ∀l < k,∀j ∈ Bl : d(j, P ) ≤ τl+1d(j,Q).
This implies ∀l < k,∀j ∈ Bl : d(P,Q) ≤ d(j, P ) + d(j,Q) ≤ (τl+1 + 1)d(j,Q).
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It follows that
k−1∑
l=1
∑
j∈Bl
d(j, P ) ≤
k∑
l=1
∑
j∈Bl
τl+1d(j,Q)
=
k−1∑
l=1
∑
j∈Bl
(
τl+1d(j,Q) + (δ − τl+1)d(j,Q)− (δ − τl+1)d(j,Q)
)
=
k−1∑
l=1
∑
j∈Bl
δd(j,Q)−
k∑
l=1
∑
j∈Bl
(δ − τl+1)d(j,Q)
≤
k−1∑
l=1
∑
j∈Bl
δd(j,Q)−
k∑
l=1
∑
j∈Bl
(δ − τl+1
τl+1 + 1
)
d(P,Q)
Lemma 23. If P wins then
m∑
l=k
∑
j∈Bl
d(j, P ) ≤
m∑
l=k
∑
j∈Bl
δd(j,Q) +
m∑
l=k
∑
j∈Bl
( τl+1−δτl+1−1 )d(P,Q)
Proof. Recall from the definition of Bl that ∀l ≥ k, ∀j ∈ Bl : d(j, P ) ≤ τl+1d(j,Q).
From triangle inequality ∀j : d(j, P ) ≤ d(j,Q) + d(P,Q).
Together these imply, ∀l ≥ k, ∀j ∈ Bl : d(j, P ) ≤ xτl+1d(j,Q) + (1− x)
(
d(j,Q) + d(P,Q)
)
for
any 0 ≤ x ≤ 1.
Below, for each l ≥ k we choose x = δ−1τl+1−1 ≤ 1.
It follows that
m∑
l=k
∑
j∈Bl
d(j, P ) ≤
m∑
l=k
∑
j∈Bl
( δ − 1
τl+1 − 1
)
τl+1d(j,Q) +
(
1− δ − 1
τl+1 − 1
)(
d(j,Q) + d(P,Q)
)
=
m∑
l=k
∑
j∈Bl
δd(j,Q) +
m∑
l=k
∑
j∈Bl
(
1− δ − 1
τl+1 − 1
)
d(P,Q)
=
m∑
l=k
∑
j∈Bl
δd(j,Q) +
m∑
l=k
∑
j∈Bl
(τl+1 − δ
τl+1 − 1
)
d(P,Q)
By summing over the inequalities in the four preceding lemmas, we have
SC(P ) ≤ δSC(Q) + d(P,Q)
( m∑
l=k
∑
j∈Bl
(τl+1 − δ
τl+1 − 1
)− k∑
l=1
∑
j∈Bl
(δ − τl+1
τl+1 + 1
)
−
m∑
l=1
∑
i∈Al
(δτl − 1
τl + 1
))
If Condition 18 holds when P wins the d(P,Q) term on the RHS is non-positive, and we have
SC(P ) ≤ δSC(Q) as desired.
We have now shown that any voting rule obeying the above condition has distortion at most δ. We
now prove that for any instance, selecting one of the two candidates must satisfy Condition 18, so we
can construct resolute single-winner voting rules which satisfy this condition. Last, we provide a specific
weighted majority rule which always satisfies Condition 18.
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Lemma 24. Given any instance, i.e., a set of voters, two candidates, and a set of thresholds, selecting
at least one of the candidates must satisfy Condition 18.
Proof. Put another way, at least one of the two inequalities in Condition 18 must hold, so there can be
no instance in which neither candidate can be selected.
Suppose δ ≥ max
0≤l≤m
{ τlτl+1+2τl+1−1τlτl+1+1 }.
By moving over the denominator, this can be rewritten as
∀l ≤ m : δ(τlτl+1 + 1) ≥ τlτl+1 + 2τl+1 − 1
or
∀l ≤ m : (δτl − 1)(τl+1 − 1)− (τl + 1)(τl+1 − δ) ≥ 0.
We can divide both sizes to obtain
∀l ≤ m : (δτl − 1)(τl+1 − 1)− (τl + 1)(τl+1 − δ)
(τl + 1)(τl+1 − 1) ≥ 0
and simplify to get,
∀l ≤ m : δτl − 1
τl + 1
− τl+1 − δ
τl+1 − 1 ≥ 0.
We can now express our inequality in terms of the sets of voters
m∑
l=k
(|Al|+ |Bl|)(δτl − 1
τl + 1
− τl+1 − δ
τl+1 − 1) ≥ 0
and separate to yield
m∑
l=k
(|Al|+ |Bl|)(δτl − 1
τl + 1
− τl+1 − δ
τl+1 − 1) +
k−1∑
l=1
(|Al|+ |Bl|)(δτl − 1
τl + 1
+
δ − τl+1
τl+1 + 1
) ≥ 0.
We can separate terms further to see that
m∑
l=k
(
τl+1 − δ
τl+1 − 1)(|Al|+ |Bl|) ≤
m∑
l=1
(
δτl − 1
τl + 1
)(|Al|+ |Bl|) +
k−1∑
l=1
(|Al|+ |Bl|)(δ − τl+1
τl+1 + 1
).
As a consequence, one of the following must be true for the sum of these inequalities to be true:
m∑
l=k
(
τl+1 − δ
τl+1 − 1)|Bl| ≤
m∑
l=1
(
δτl − 1
τl + 1
)|Al|+
k−1∑
l=1
|Bl|(δ − τl+1
τl+1 + 1
) (5)
m∑
l=k
(
τl+1 − δ
τl+1 − 1)|Al| ≤
m∑
l=1
(
δτl − 1
τl + 1
)|Bl|+
k−1∑
l=1
|Al|(δ − τl+1
τl+1 + 1
) (6)
Therefore resolute single-winner voting rules which maintain Condition 18 can be created, and such
a rule achieves optimal distortion between two candidates. We consider one such rule below, although
many are possible.
Weighted Majority Rule 4.
For all l < k, assign to all voters in Al and Bl a weight of
(δ+1)(τlτl+1−1)
(τl+1)(τl+1+1)
. For all l ≥ k, assign voters
in Al and Bl a weight of
(
( τl+1−δτl+1−1 ) + (
δτl−1
τl+1
)
)
. Lastly, assign all voters in C a weight of 0. Choose the
candidate by a weighted majority vote.
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Theorem 25. Weighted Majority Rule 4 satisfies Condition 18, and therefore achieves the optimal dis-
tortion for two candidates with preference strength information.
Proof. Consider the two inequalities in Condition 18 which dictate whether it is permissible to choose P
orQ respectively. We can take the difference RHS - LHS of each inequality, which must be non-negative
for at least one of them, and choose the candidate corresponding to the inequality that yields a bigger
difference. This is exactly our weighted majority rule.
Weighted Majority Rule 4 is well-behaved because voters with weaker preferences are assigned
smaller weights. Voters whose preferences are so weak that we cannot determine their preferred candi-
date must have a weight of 0 because it is unknown who they support, and no voters have negative weight.
However, voters with preference strength tending towards infinity cannot have infinitely large weights.
Here, the weights of the voters whose decisiveness is higher than τm is 1 + δτm−1τm+1 , which converges
asymptotically to δ + 1 as τm → ∞. However, many other rules with the same distortion are possible
and it is an open question to determine which rules yield the best distortion for multiple candidates.
How much effort, time, and money, should someone charged with developing a voting protocol, or
with choosing an alternative minimizing social cost, spend in order to understand the preference strengths
of voters in more detail? With only ordinal preferences (m = 1, τ = 1), the best distortion achievable
is by simple majority vote, yielding a distortion of 3. However, if we are permitted any single threshold
of our choice (m = 1, 1 < τ), we can bring the distortion down to significantly to 2. With any two
thresholds of our choice (m = 1, 1 ≤ τ1 < τ2), we can bring distortion down further to 5/3 ≈ 1.67, and
as the number of thresholds permitted increases we see distortion converge to
√
2 ≈ 1.4. (See Figure
3.) This is because in the limit when we know the exact preference strengths of all voters, distortion can
be bounded by
√
2, as we show in the next section. Thus, there is not much incentive to spend a huge
amount of money to understand exact preference strengths, as one or two carefully chosen thresholds
already provide very good distortion.
For the general case with arbitrary thresholds and no extra assumptions, we can demonstrate a bound
of δ2 on distortion for three or more candidates. This is obtained simply by forming a pairwise majority
graph based on the above weighted majority rule, and then taking any alternative in the uncovered set
of the resulting graph. It remains an open question whether there exist weighted majority rules that
can improve the bound on distortion in the general case using this method, as we can when we have a
single threshold and preferences, or preferences alone. More generally, it is unknown how to get a tight
bound on distortion with multiple candidates using any rule, even in the simpler case with only ordinal
preferences [25].
Figure 4: Best achievable distortion for two candi-
dates if allowed the best choice of m thresholds.
Converges to
√
2 with the number of thresholds.
Figure 5: Best known distortion for multiple can-
didates if allowed the best choice of m thresholds.
Converges to 2 with the number of thresholds.
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6.1 Exact Preference Strengths of All Voters
In this section, for completeness of analysis, we consider the case when we know the exact preference
strengths of all the voters with respect to every pair of candidates. This corresponds to the limit settings
in which are have an infinite number of thresholds which includes every number greater than 1. As we
established previously, even with this knowledge it is not possible to form deterministic algorithms with
distortion better than
√
2. Here we give a mechanism which obtains this bounds.
Suppose there are two candidates P and Q, and we are given the preference strengths of every voter.
Denote A as the set of voters that prefer P to Q, and B as the set of voters that prefer Q to P . The
preference strength of any i ∈ A is denoted as αi, and the preference strength of any j ∈ B is denoted
as βj ,
Theorem 26. With 2 candidates P and Q in a metric, given the exact preference strength of every voter,
if
∑
i∈A
√
2αi−1
αi+1
≥∑j∈B|βj>√2 βj−√2βj−1 −∑j∈B|βj≤√2 (√2−βj)βj+1 , then SC(P ) ≤ √2SC(Q).
Proof. ∀i ∈ A,
d(P,Q) ≤ d(i, P ) + d(i, Q) = αi + 1
αi
(i, Q)
Bound the sum of d(i, P ) for all i ∈ A:∑
i∈A
d(i, P ) =
∑
i∈A
1
αi
d(i, Q)
=
∑
i∈A
1
αi
d(i, Q) +
√
2
∑
i∈A
d(i, Q)−
√
2
∑
i∈A
d(i, Q)
=
√
2
∑
i∈A
d(i, Q)−
∑
i∈A
(
√
2− 1
αi
)d(i, Q)
≤
√
2
∑
i∈A
d(i, Q)−
∑
i∈A
(
√
2− 1
αi
)
αi
αi + 1
d(P,Q)
=
√
2
∑
i∈A
d(i, Q)−
∑
i∈A
√
2αi − 1
αi + 1
d(P,Q)
We know that ∀j ∈ B such that βj ≤
√
2,
d(P,Q) ≤ d(j, P ) + d(j,Q) = (βj + 1)(j,Q)
Bound the sum of d(j, P ) for all j ∈ B that βj ≤
√
2,∑
j∈B|βj≤
√
2
d(j, P ) =
∑
j∈B|βj≤
√
2
βjd(j,Q)
=
∑
j∈B|βj≤
√
2
βjd(j,Q) +
√
2
∑
j∈B|βj≤
√
2
d(j,Q)−
√
2
∑
j∈B|βj≤
√
2
d(j,Q)
=
√
2
∑
j∈B|βj≤
√
2
d(j,Q)−
∑
j∈B|βj≤
√
2
(
√
2− βj)d(j,Q)
≤
√
2
∑
j∈B|βj≤
√
2
d(j,Q)−
∑
j∈B|βj≤
√
2
√
2− βj
βj + 1
d(P,Q)
∀j ∈ B such that βj >
√
2,
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d(j, P ) ≤ d(j,Q) + d(P,Q)
(1− 1
βj
)d(j, P ) ≤ d(P,Q)
d(j, P ) ≤ βj
βj − 1d(P,Q)
We also know that d(j, P ) = βjd(j,Q). Thus,
d(j, P ) =
√
2
βj
d(j, P ) + (1−
√
2
βj
)d(j, P )
=
√
2
βj
× βjd(j,Q) + βj −
√
2
βj
d(j, P )
≤
√
2d(j,Q) +
βj −
√
2
βj
× βj
βj − 1d(P,Q)
=
√
2d(j,Q) +
βj −
√
2
βj − 1 d(P,Q)
Summing up for all j ∈ B such that βj >
√
2,
∑
j∈B|βj>
√
2
d(j, P ) ≤
√
2
∑
j∈B|βj>
√
2
d(j,Q) +
∑
j∈B|βj>
√
2
βj −
√
2
βj − 1 d(P,Q)
Putting everything together,∑
i∈A
d(i, P ) +
∑
j∈B
d(j, P )
=
∑
i∈A
1
αi
d(i, Q) +
∑
j∈B|βj≤
√
2
d(j, P ) +
∑
j∈B|βj>
√
2
d(j, P )
≤
√
2
∑
i∈A∪B
d(i, Q) + (−
∑
i∈A
√
2αi − 1
αi + 1
−
∑
j∈B|βj≤
√
2
√
2− βj
βj + 1
+
∑
j∈B|βj>
√
2
βj −
√
2
βj − 1 )d(P,Q)
≤
√
2
∑
i∈A∪B
d(i, Q)
Weighted Majority Rule 5. Given the exact preference strength of every voter for two candidates,
assign weight
√
2αi−1
αi+1
to each voter i ∈ A such that αi >
√
2, and weight αi − 1 to each voter i ∈ A
such that αi ≤
√
2. Assign weight
√
2βj−1
βj+1
to each voter j ∈ B such that βj >
√
2 and weight βj − 1 to
each voter j ∈ B such that βj ≤
√
2.
Theorem 27. Using Weighted Majority Rule 5, the distortion is at most
√
2 for two candidates, and this
is the best bound possible.
Proof. Without loss of generality, suppose
∑
i∈A|αi>
√
2
√
2αi−1
αi+1
+
∑
i∈A|αi≤
√
2(αi − 1) ≥∑
j∈B|βj>
√
2
√
2βj−1
βj+1
+
∑
j∈B|βj≤
√
2(βj − 1), and we choose P as the winner.
For αi ≤
√
2, (αi − 1) ≤
√
2αi−1
αi+1
. By the condition above,
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∑
i∈A|αi>
√
2
√
2αi − 1
αi + 1
+
∑
i∈A|αi≤
√
2
(αi − 1) ≥
∑
j∈B|βj>
√
2
√
2βj − 1
βj + 1
+
∑
j∈B|βj≤
√
2
(βj − 1)
∑
i∈A|αi>
√
2
√
2αi − 1
αi + 1
+
∑
i∈A|αi≤
√
2
√
2αi − 1
αi + 1
≥
∑
j∈B|βj>
√
2
√
2βj − 1
βj + 1
+
∑
j∈B|βj≤
√
2
(βj − 1)
∑
i∈A
√
2αi − 1
αi + 1
≥
∑
j∈B|βj>
√
2
βj −
√
2
βj − 1∑
i∈A
√
2αi − 1
αi + 1
≥
∑
j∈B|βj>
√
2
βj −
√
2
βj − 1 −
∑
j∈B|βj≤
√
2
(
√
2− βj)
βj + 1
The second to last line follows because ∀βj ≥ 1,
√
2βj−1
βj+1
≥ βj−
√
2
βj−1 . By Theorem 26, the distortion
is at most
√
2.
Now we show the claim above that ∀βj ≥ 1,
√
2βj−1
βj+1
≥ βj−
√
2
βj−1 to finish the proof.
(βj − (
√
2 + 1))2 ≥ 0
β2j − 2(
√
2 + 1)βj + (
√
2 + 1)2 ≥ 0
(
√
2− 1)β2j − 2(
√
2 + 1)(
√
2− 1)βj + (
√
2 + 1)2(
√
2− 1) ≥ 0
(
√
2− 1)β2j − 2βj +
√
2 + 1 ≥ 0√
2β2j − βj + 1 ≥ β2j + βj −
√
2√
2β2j − βj −
√
2βj + 1 ≥ β2j + βj −
√
2βj −
√
2
(
√
2βj − 1)(βj − 1) ≥ (βj −
√
2)(βj + 1)√
2βj − 1
βj + 1
≥ βj −
√
2
βj − 1
Corollary 28. Choosing a candidate from the uncovered set of a weighted majority graph obtained by
using pairwise rule 5 results in distortion of at most 2 for any number of candidates.
This corollary is simply because if pairwise distortion is at most δ, then the distortion of the uncov-
ered set is at most δ2. While for other special cases we have better bounds on distortion with multiple
candidates, for this case this general bound provides the best result.
7 Ideal Candidate Distortion
In this section, we study the tradeoff between the winning candidate distortion δI and the ideal candidate
distortion ∆. For instance I = {V, C, d}, suppose the winner is P , and the optimal candidate is Q.
Denote the distortion of P as δI =
SC(P )
SC(Q) . Recall the ideal candidate is the best possible point in the
metric that minimizes the total social cost (this point may or may not be in C); we denote this point as
Z∗ 2. Then the ideal candidate distortion ∆ of a candidate P is ∆ = SC(P )SC(Z∗) .
We show that for any instance, we have that either the distortion of our mechanism is small, or the
ideal candidate distortion of our winning candidate is small. In other words, we establish that the only
time when the selected alternative is not similar to the absolutely best possible alternative (which may be
even better than any of the candidates in the running), is when it is similar to the best candidate from the
ones up for consideration. So, for cases when distortion is large, at least we have a “consolation prize”
2In a Euclidean metric, Z* is the centroid
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that the chosen candidate is not too far from all possible alternatives, even the ones which the voters
don’t know about and do not express their preferences over.
To prove our results, we first need the following definition of a λ-bounded rule.
Definition 29. A majority rule is λ-bounded if P beating Q directly in pairwise comparison implies
SC(P ) ≤ SC(Q) + λ · SC(Z) for any point Z in the metric space.
Theorem 30. If P wins under a λ-bounded majority rule with two candidates, then ∆ = SC(P )SC(Z∗) ≤
λδI
δI−1 . If P is in the uncovered set under a λ-bounded majority rule with multiple candidates, then ∆ =
SC(P )
SC(Z∗) ≤ 2λδIδI−1 .
Proof. First consider the two candidates setting. We know that SC(Q) = 1δI SC(P ), and by the defini-
tion of λ-bounded majority rule,
SC(P ) ≤ SC(Q) + λSC(Z∗)
SC(P ) ≤ 1
δI
SC(P ) + λSC(Z∗)
SC(P ) ≤ λδI
δI − 1SC(Z
∗)
Then for the multiple candidates setting, if P is in the uncovered set, we know that either P beats Q
directly (and we get the same bound as in the two candidates setting), or there exists a candidate Y , that
P beats Y and Y beats Q. Then by the definition of λ-bounded majority rule,
SC(P ) ≤ SC(Y ) + λSC(Z∗)
SC(P ) ≤ SC(Q) + λSC(Z∗) + λSC(Z∗)
SC(P ) ≤ 1
δI
SC(P ) + 2λSC(Z∗)
SC(P ) ≤ 2λδI
δI − 1SC(Z
∗)
Corollary 31. With only voters’ ordinal preferences, in the two candidates setting, the majority winner
has an ideal candidate distortion of ∆ ≤ 2δIδI−1 . And in the multiple candidate setting, any candidate in
the uncovered set has an ideal candidate distortion of ∆ ≤ 4δIδI−1 .
Proof. By Lemma 12, the majority rule is 2-bounded. Then we get the conclusion directly from Theorem
30.
Thus, in the usual “ordinal preference” setting of [1] and [20], either distortion of Copeland (or any
candidate in the uncovered set) is actually bounded by δI ≤ 3 (instead of the worst-case of 5), or the
ideal candidate distortion ∆ ≤ 6, which may not seem like a great bound, but is impressive because it
means that the selected candidate is a factor of 6 away from all possibilities, ones that are not known
to anyone, ones that no one expresses their preferences over, and ones that may arise sometime in the
future. The only assumption required is that all the possible alternatives and voters lie in some arbitrary,
possibly very high-dimensional, metric space.
The same tradeoff between δI and ∆ occurs if we have are given voters’ preferences and a single
threshold on preference strength, as in Section 4.
Corollary 32. With voter preferences and a single threshold τ , we use Weighted Majority Rule 1 to
decide pairwise winners. Then in the two candidate setting, the winner has an ideal candidate distortion
of ∆ ≤ 2δIδI−1 (Figure 6). And in the multiple candidate setting, any candidate in the uncovered set has
an ideal candidate distortion of ∆ ≤ 4δIδI−1 (Figure 7).
Proof. By Theorem 13, Weighted Majority Rule 1 is 2-bounded. Then we get the conclusion directly
from Theorem 30.
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Figure 6: Tradeoff between δI and ∆ with voter
preferences and a single threshold τ in the two can-
didates setting.
Figure 7: Tradeoff between δI and ∆ with voter
preferences and a single threshold τ in the multiple
candidates setting.
7.1 Ideal Candidate Distortion with Exact Preference Strengths
In this section, we discuss the ideal candidate distortion when we know the voters’ exact preference
strength. We first show Weighted Majority Rule 5 is (1 +
√
2)-bounded, then get the ideal candidate
distortion by Theorem 30.
Suppose there are two candidates P and Q, and we are given the preference strength of every voter.
Denote A as the set of voters that prefer P to Q, and B as the set of voters that prefer Q to P . The
preference strength of any i ∈ A is denoted as αi, and the preference strength of any j ∈ B is denoted
as βj ,
We first present a lemma which allows us to charge voters in B to voters in A; this lemma has not
appeared previously and may be useful as a technique for proving other results as well.
Lemma 33. Given any voter i ∈ A, and voter j ∈ B, we have that d(j, P ) ≤ βj(αi+1)αiβj−1 d(i, j).
Proof. By the triangle inequality, d(i, j) ≥ d(j, P ) − d(i, P ), and d(i, j) ≥ d(i, Q) − d(j,Q) =
αid(i, P )− 1βj d(j, P ). Thus, d(i, j) ≥ max{d(j, P )− d(i, P ), αid(i, P )− 1βj d(j, P )}.
Case 1. d(j, P )− d(i, P ) ≥ αid(i, P )− 1βj d(j, P ):
d(j, P )− d(i, P ) ≥ αid(i, P )− 1
βj
d(j, P )
(1 +
1
βj
)d(j, P ) ≥ (α+ 1)d(i, P )
d(i, P ) ≤ βj + 1
βj(αi + 1)
d(j, P )
d(i, j) ≥ d(j, P )− d(i, P )
≥ d(j, P )− βj + 1
βj(αi + 1)
d(j, P )
=
αiβj − 1
βj(αi + 1)
d(j, P )
Case 2. d(j, P )− d(i, P ) < αid(i, P )− 1βj d(j, P ):
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d(j, P )− d(i, P ) < αid(i, P )− 1
βj
d(j, P )
(1 +
1
βj
)d(j, P ) < (α+ 1)d(i, P )
d(i, P ) >
βj + 1
βj(αi + 1)
d(j, P )
d(i, j) ≥ αid(i, P )− 1
βj
d(j, P )
>
αiβj − 1
βj(αi + 1)
d(j, P )
Lemma 34. If Weighted Majority Rule 5 selects P over Q, for any i ∈ A, j ∈ B, let rij = (βj−1)(αi+1)αiβj−1 .
Then
∑
j∈B
1∑
i∈A
1
rij
≤ 1 +√2.
Proof. ∑
j∈B
1∑
i∈A
1
rij
=
∑
j∈B
1∑
i∈A
αiβj−1
(βj−1)(αi+1)
=
∑
j∈B
1
βj
βj−1
∑
i∈A
αi− 1βj
αi+1
≤
∑
j∈B
1
βj
βj−1
∑
i∈A
αi−1
αi+1
=
∑
j∈B
βj−1
βj∑
i∈A
αi−1
αi+1
If P is selected as the winner, it means∑
i∈A|αi>
√
2
√
2αi − 1
αi + 1
+
∑
i∈A|αi≤
√
2
(αi − 1) ≥
∑
j∈B|βj>
√
2
√
2βj − 1
βj + 1
+
∑
j∈B|βj≤
√
2
(βj − 1)
Claim 35. ∀αi ≥
√
2,
√
2αi−1
αi+1
αi−1
αi+1
=
√
2αi−1
αi−1 ≤
√
2
Claim 36. ∀αi ≤
√
2, αi−1αi−1
αi+1
= αi + 1 ≤ 1 +
√
2
Claim 37. ∀βj ≥
√
2,
βj−1
βj√
2βj−1
βj+1
≤ 2(√2− 1) < 1
Proof.
((
√
2− 1)βj − 1)2 ≥ 0
(3− 2
√
2)β2j − 2(
√
2− 1)βj + 1 ≥ 0
(2− 2
√
2)β2j − 2(
√
2− 1)βj ≥ β2j − 1
2(
√
2− 1)(
√
2β2j − βj) ≥ β2j − 1
2(
√
2− 1)βj(
√
2βj − 1) ≥ (βj + 1)(βj − 1)
2(
√
2− 1)
√
2βj − 1
βj + 1
≥ βj − 1
βj
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Claim 38. ∀βj ≤
√
2,
βj−1
βj
βj−1 =
1
βj
≤ 1
By the four claims above,
∑
j∈B
βj − 1
βj
≤
∑
j∈B|βj>
√
2
√
2βj − 1
βj + 1
+
∑
j∈B|βj≤
√
2
(βj − 1)
≤
∑
i∈A|αi>
√
2
√
2αi − 1
αi + 1
+
∑
i∈A|αi≤
√
2
(αi − 1)
≤ (1 +
√
2)
∑
i∈A
αi − 1
αi + 1
Thus,
∑
j∈B
1∑
i∈A
1
rij
≤
∑
j∈B
βj−1
βj∑
i∈A
αi−1
αi+1
≤ (1 +
√
2)
Theorem 39. If Weighted Majority Rule 5 selects P over Q, then SC(P ) ≤ (1 +√2)SC(Z) + SC(Q)
where Z can be any point in the metric space.
Proof. Let A be the set of voters prefer P to Q, and B be the set of voters prefer Q to P . If P is selected
as the winner, it means
∑
i∈A|αi>
√
2
√
2αi − 1
αi + 1
+
∑
i∈A|αi≤
√
2
(αi − 1) ≥
∑
j∈B|βj>
√
2
√
2βj − 1
βj + 1
+
∑
j∈B|βj≤
√
2
(βj − 1)
Select an arbitrary voter i ∈ A, and voter j ∈ B.
By Lemma 33,
d(j, P ) ≤ βj(αi + 1)
αiβj − 1 d(i, j)
βj − 1
βj
d(j, P ) ≤ βj − 1
βj
× βj(αi + 1)
αiβj − 1 d(i, j)
βj − 1
βj
d(j, P ) ≤ (βj − 1)(αi + 1)
αiβj − 1 d(i, j)
βj − 1
βj
d(j, P ) ≤ (βj − 1)(αi + 1)
αiβj − 1 (d(i, Z) + d(j, Z))
Let rij =
(βj−1)(αi+1)
αiβj−1 ,
1
rij
βj − 1
βj
d(j, P ) ≤ (d(i, Z) + d(j, Z))
Claim 40. For any αi ≥ 1, βj ≥ 1, rij ≤ 2.
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Proof.
αi ≥ 1
αi(βj + 1) ≥ βj + 1
αiβj + αi − βj − 1 ≥ 0
2αiβj − αiβj + αi − βj − 2 + 1 ≥ 0
2αiβj − 2 ≥ αiβj − αi + βj − 1
2(αiβj − 1) ≥ (αi + 1)(βj − 1)
(βj − 1)(αi + 1)
αiβj − 1 ≤ 2
Sum up for all i ∈ A,∑
i∈A
1
rij
βj − 1
βj
d(j, P ) ≤
∑
i∈A
(d(i, Z) + d(j, Z))
βj − 1
βj
d(j, P ) ≤ 1∑
i∈A
1
rij
∑
i∈A
d(i, Z) +
1∑
i∈A
1
rij
|A|d(j, Z)
Then sum up for all j ∈ B,∑
j∈B
βj − 1
βj
d(j, P ) ≤
∑
j∈B
1∑
i∈A
1
rij
∑
i∈A
d(i, Z) + |A|
∑
j∈B
1∑
i∈A
1
rij
d(j, Z)
≤
∑
j∈B
1∑
i∈A
1
rij
∑
i∈A
d(i, Z) + |A|
∑
j∈B
1∑
i∈A
1
2
d(j, Z)
≤
∑
j∈B
1∑
i∈A
1
rij
∑
i∈A
d(i, Z) + 2
∑
j∈B
d(j, Z)
≤ (1 +
√
2)
∑
i∈A
d(i, Z) + 2
∑
j∈B
d(j, Z)
Thus,∑
i∈A
d(i, P ) +
∑
j∈B
d(j, P ) =
∑
i∈A
d(i, P ) +
∑
j∈B
(
1
βj
+
βj − 1
βj
)d(j, P )
≤
∑
i∈A
d(i, Q) +
∑
j∈B
d(i, Q) +
∑
j∈B
βj − 1
βj
d(j, P )
≤
∑
i∈A
d(i, Q) +
∑
j∈B
d(i, Q) + (1 +
√
2)
∑
i∈A
d(i, Z) + 2
∑
j∈B
d(j, Z)
Corollary 41. With every voter’s exact preference strength, we use Weighted Majority Rule 5 to de-
cide pairwise winners. In the two candidates setting, the winner has an ideal candidate distortion of
∆ ≤ (
√
2+1)δI
δI−1 . And in the multiple candidate setting, any candidate in the uncovered set has an ideal
candidate distortion of ∆ ≤ 2(
√
2+1)δI
δI−1 .
Proof. By Theorem 39, Weighted Majority Rule 5 is (
√
2 + 1)-bounded. Then we get the conclusion
directly from Theorem 30.
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7.2 Ideal Candidate Distortion without knowing voter preferences
In Section 5, we discussed that with only one threshold τ , Weighted Majority Rule 3 is not λ-bounded
for any constant λ. However, we can still get some tradeoff between the distortion δI of the winning
candidate and the ideal candidate distortion ∆ for δI in a certain range. We will first show the relationship
among SC(P ), SC(Q), and SC(Z) for any point Z in the metric space by the following lemma.
Lemma 42. Consider the setting with two candidates P , Q, and a single threshold τ . If P pairwise
beats Q by Weighted Majority Rule 3, then SC(P ) ≤ τSC(Q) + 2SC(Z) for any point Z in the metric
space.
Proof. Let A denote the set of voters who prefer P to Q and have preference strength ≥ τ , let B denote
the set of voters who prefer Q to P and have preference strength ≥ τ , and let C denote the rest of the
voters. Because P pairwise beats Q by Weighted Majority Rule 3, we know that |A| ≥ |B|.
For voters in A and B, by Lemma 12,
∑
i∈A+B d(i, P ) ≤
∑
i∈A+B d(i, Q) + 2
∑
i∈A+B d(i, Z).
For voters inC, because we know that they do not strongly preferQ to P , it must be that
∑
i∈C d(i, P ) ≤
τ
∑
i∈C d(i, Q). Summing up all the voters in A, B, C, we get SC(P ) ≤ τSC(Q) + 2SC(Z).
Theorem 43. Consider the setting with two candidates P , Q, and a single threshold τ . Suppose Z∗ is
the ideal possible candidate. If P pairwise beats Q by Weighted Majority Rule 3, when the distortion
δI ≥ τ , then ∆ = SC(P )SC(Z∗) ≤ 2δIδI−τ .
Proof. By Lemma 42, we know that:
SC(P ) ≤ τSC(Q) + 2SC(Z∗)
SC(P ) ≤ τ × 1
δI
SC(P ) + 2SC(Z∗)
(1− τ
δI
)SC(P ) ≤ 2SC(Z∗)
SC(P ) ≤ 2δI
δI − τ SC(Z
∗)
Rewriting the bound of ∆ in terms of δIτ , ∆ ≤
2
δI
τ
δI
τ −1
when δIτ ≥ 1. Thus the tradeoff is the same as in
the case with only ordinal preferences being known (Figure 6), except replacing δI with δIτ . This makes
sense since the case with only ordinal preferences is exactly the special case with a single threshold
τ = 1.
7.3 Ideal Candidate Distortion with General Thresholds
In Section 7.2, we discussed that with only one threshold τ , there is a tradeoff between δI and ∆ when
the distortion δI ≥ τ . Similarly, in the general setting when we are given m thresholds {1 ≤ τ1 < τ2 <
. . . < τm}, there is also a tradeoff between δI and ∆ when the distortion δI ≥ τm.
Lemma 44. Consider the setting with two candidates P , Q, and thresholds {1 ≤ τ1 < τ2 < . . . < τm}.
If P pairwise beats Q by Weighted Majority Rule 4, then SC(P ) ≤ τmSC(Q) + 2SC(Z) for any point
Z in the metric space.
Proof. Let A denote the set of all the voters that prefer P to Q, and have preference strength ≥ τ1, i.e.,
A = A1 ∪ A2 ∪ · · · ∪ Am. Recall Al denotes the set of voters have preference strength αi such that
τl ≤ αi < τl+1. Similarly, define B = B1 ∪B2 ∪ · · · ∪Bm.
First we prove the size of A is at least the size of Bm. In the proof of Theorem 25, we have discussed
that Weighted Majority Rule 4 assigns heavier weights to voters with stronger preference strengths. Thus,
the voters in Bm and Am are assigned the heaviest weight. Remember voters in C are assigned weight
0, so the winner is decided by voters in A and B. If P wins over Q, it must be the case that |Bm| ≤ |A|,
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because otherwise the total weight of voters in Bm must be higher than the total weight of voters in A,
and Q would be the winner instead.
For voters in A and Bm, by Lemma 12,
∑
i∈A+Bm d(i, P ) ≤
∑
i∈A+Bm d(i, Q) +
2
∑
i∈A+Bm d(i, Z). For any other voter i in C or Bl (l < m), we know that d(i, P ) ≤ τmd(i, Q).
Summing up for all voters, we get SC(P ) ≤ τmSC(Q) + 2SC(Z).
Theorem 45. Consider the setting with two candidates P , Q, and thresholds {1 ≤ τ1 < τ2 < . . . <
τm}. Suppose Z∗ is the ideal possible candidate. If P pairwise beats Q by Weighted Majority Rule 4,
when the distortion δI ≥ τm, then ∆ = SC(P )SC(Z∗) ≤ 2δIδI−τm .
Proof. The proof is exactly the same as for Theorem 43, by using Lemma 44 instead of Lemma 42.
8 Conclusion
As we have shown, even a tiny amount of preference strength information allows us to significantly
improve the distortion of social choice mechanisms. We quantify tradeoffs between the amount of infor-
mation known about preference strengths and the achievable distortion and provide advice about which
type of information about preference strengths seems to be the most useful.
When voters provide a single bit of extra preference strength information beyond their ordinal pref-
erences, the distortion drops from 3 down to 1.83 between two candidates and from 4.236 down to 3.35
for multiple candidates if we can choose our threshold. When the exact preference strengths of all voters
are known the distortion falls precipitously down to
√
2 for two candidates and 2 for multiple candidates.
In general, with only one or two chosen thresholds, one would not choose a threshold of τ1 = 1, since
it conveys less information than a slightly larger threshold. Intuitively, having a small barrier to voting
that requires some effort to overcome means that only the votes of those with some stake in the outcome
are included, but setting such a barrier too high can mean that many people with some interest in the
decision are excluded. If we have more thresholds at our disposal we can further minimize distortion, but
there are diminishing returns to additional thresholds. Considering the large improvements to distortion
given just a single extra threshold, further information may not be worth the effort to obtain.
Unfortunately, one of the drawbacks to distortion as a measure efficiency is that it is not robust in
practice. For example, with multiple candidates, the addition or subtraction of a single candidate or voter
can cause the actual approximation achieved by Copeland in an instance to swing between 1 (optimal)
and 5 (worst-case distortion). Our notion of ideal candidate distortion partly addresses this issue by
showing that the distortion of Copeland (and other λ-bounded rules) can only be high when the winning
candidate is within a constant factor of the ideal conceivable candidate, even if they are not a candidate
and nothing about them is known. However, when distortion is low the ideal candidate distortion is
unbounded in general. Therefore we observe a general tradeoff between the quality of the available
candidates and how poorly we might possibly choose from among the candidates.
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